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IMAS and PPE Requirements
By Andy Smith, AVS Mine Action Consultants
Published in the JMU Journal of Mine Action: Issue 7.1, April 2003
This paper explains the personal protective equipment (PPE) that a
demining group must use in order to comply with the United Nations’
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The author was an
active member of the User Focus Group advising the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) when they
made the current IMAS revision. He continues as an elected
member of the IMAS Review Board. The author has also maintained
a database of demining accidents for five years, and uses the
evidence of real accidents to inform his views on protection needs.
In June 2000, I published a paper in this journal under the title “The
Facts on Protection Needs in Humanitarian Demining.”2 In that
paper, I explained how the results of real accidents in demining
could be used to assess protection needs. That paper was intended
to provide a “reality check”—a balance against a few PPE
manufacturers who had scented a market and thrown common
sense aside in their pursuit of profit. Today, the pseudo-academic
hysteria continues and a new generation of potential purchasers
may benefit from reading the truth about protection needs.
My views in this paper are based on extensive field experience, the
detailed investigations in the Database of Demining Accidents
(DDAS)3 and on the many follow-up interviews of accident victims
that I have undertaken. Statistics quoted in this paper are derived
from the latest version of the database, including data not included
in the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) version
released through GICHD last year.4
Risk and Its Reduction
Anyone considering the risks in demining should be aware that
demining accidents are rare. While I do not have all of the relevant
data, I have been able to make a statistical study of the frequency of
demining accidents for some theatres in some years. To make this
study you must have reliable information about the numbers of
deminers and supervisors actually working in mined areas, the
hours worked and the accidents suffered. My limited investigation
showed that severely disabling accidents occur at the rate of one for
each 30+ person-years of actual demining. I believe that this is a
worst-case figure—and that accidents in most demining theatres are
much rarer than this.

However rare they may be, explosive accidents can inflict very
severe injuries. Because demining is a humanitarian activity, there is
an obligation for employers to acknowledge a duty of care and take
all reasonable measures to reduce the injuries that deminers may
suffer as they work.
This can be pursued “procedurally” by seeking to reduce the number
of accidents that occur. It can also be approached by seeking to
reduce the severity of injury by using PPE. The distinction between
these two approaches is important. While many accidents were
caused by procedural errors or omissions and so could have been
avoided, up to 25 percent of all accidents are deemed unavoidable.
So while improvements in training, management and field
supervision could prevent many accidents, some would still occur.
The only way to reduce the impact of the unavoidable accidents is to
reduce the severity of the injuries that result.
The Limits of PPE
A deminer cannot realistically be shielded against the effects of
some mines and ordnance. The worst possible accident would kill a
deminer wearing the best bomb-suit. This kind of accident has
happened when moving unstable UXO in an unsafe manner, but is
very rare indeed. The worst kind of accident that a deminer might
reasonably expect is to detonate a bounding fragmentation mine or
a submunition that is very close to him. Deminers have done this
when wearing heavy frag-jackets, helmets and visors, and when
wearing no protection at all. The results in terms of injury and death
show that the PPE offered no significant protection. It may have
given the wearer false confidence.
By far the most common activity at the time of an accident is when
“excavating,” digging to locate an AP blast mine. Fortunately, this is
also the time when a deminer feels most vulnerable, and is most
willing to accept the need to use protective equipment. The term
“excavation” is used to cover the activity when a deminer is using a
probe, prodder, bayonet, scraper, pick-axe, hoe, trowel5 or any other
hand-tool to investigate a suspicious area of ground. The
investigation may follow a metal-detector reading, a dog-signal, a
break in a perceivable pattern of mines, or reliable information that a
mine or other device is there. In almost all cases, the deminer will be
squatting or kneeling as he does this.
The most common mine to be detonated while excavating is also
the largest common AP blast mine—the PMN with a 240-g TNT
main charge. A deminer can realistically be protected against the
effects of this when it detonates 30 cm (12 in) from his knees.
International Mine Action Standards and PPE
Section 10.30 of the United Nations’ IMAS has the title Personal

Protective Equipment. Designed to be as all-embracing as possible,
the standard covers the use of a range of equipment and working
stances that should make it easy for the IMAS to be adopted by
military deminers as well as humanitarian deminers in all mined
countries. Throughout the IMAS, the terms “should” and “shall” are
used with a very different meaning. When they write that something
“shall” be done, it is obligatory. If it is not done, the demining group
cannot claim to be operating in accordance with the IMAS. When
they write that something “should” be done, it indicates the authors’
“preference” and is not an obligation. If the term “may” is used, it is
only “to indicate a possible method or course of action.”
Evidence from the DDAS was used to help determine the obligatory
requirements. The only obligatory articles of PPE are frontal body
protection and a long visor. Other “optional” equipment is
mentioned. Its inclusion was either as a result of pressure from
“interested” bodies who advised the IMAS User Focus Group, or
because there were differences of opinion between group members
and those who were canvassed during “outreach” in the field. The
optional equipment includes: a) advice on when it would be
appropriate to wear helmets; b) a preference for hand-tools to be
properly designed as protective equipment; and c) an invitation that
a reader “may” like to assess the use of blast-resistant boots.
Body Protection

A PMN mine

To comply with IMAS, deminers must wear “frontal protection,
appropriate to the activity, capable of protecting against the blast
effects of 240 gm of TNT at 30 cm [12 in].” Notice that there is no
standard agreement (STANAG) V50 cited. This is not fragmentation
armour, but blast armour. Good blast armour will always provide
some fragmentation protection, but it does not have to meet the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) STANAG V50 of 450 m/s.
Under Section 4.3, “Fragmentation Protection,” the requirement is
extended with the additional preference that body armour with a
STANAG V50 of 450 m/s is used, but this is not an obligation. This
is because the authors recognised that fragmentation mines had
defeated the best PPE being used, so they decided that the risk
from them should be minimised “procedurally” rather than by
imposing an inflexible requirement for onerous PPE that would be
resisted in the field. The procedural approach involves promoting
appropriate training, field discipline and the extended use of
armoured machines for area preparation when fragmentation mines

are expected.
What this means to the end-user is that a demining group can wear
armour with a V50 lower than 450 m/s—as long as that armour
protects fully against the blast and environmental fragmentation
associated with a PMN AP blast mine at 30 cm. I know two
internationally respected groups that do this—and having tested
their armour, I can say with confidence that it performs better
against blast than many other designs with a much higher
fragmentation specification. It has also performed without any
problem in at least 35 real accidents to date. The NATO STANAG
fragmentation test was not devised to simulate a mine detonation,
and a “pass” does not prove that the armour will give suitable
protection. But there is no other test standard to use at this time, so
the IMAS compromise makes sense.
Visors
The obligatory IMAS requirements for visors is “eye protection
capable of retaining integrity against the blast effects of 240 g of
TNT at 60 cm, providing full frontal coverage of face and throat as
part of the specified frontal protection ensemble.” Five-mm thick
polycarbonate visors have been widely used to do this since the
mid-1990s.
If I had been given my way, the IMAS would state that, as a general
rule, a visor in regular use shall be replaced every six months or
sooner if vision through the visor is restricted. Others disagreed, so
this requirement was not included. There is, however, a requirement
for all protection to be regularly inspected to ensure that it is fit for
use. Users should remember that polycarbonate is hardened by UV
exposure and scratches very easily. To maintain protection and to
ensure clear vision, they should be replaced frequently.
Hand-Tools as PPE
It is a credit to those at GICHD6 who drafted the IMAS that the
available facts informed the requirements. However, other opinions
and beliefs had to be respected, especially when persuasive
evidence was available. When opinions differed, the suggested PPE
could only be included as a preference, not a requirement. This
happened with my own opinion on the need for long and blastresistant tools. I believed that there was enough evidence to make
them a requirement, but there were contrary opinions and the safer
hand tools became “preferred” instead of obligatory.
On hand-tools, IMAS now reads:
Hand tools should be constructed in such a way that
their separation or fragmentation resulting from the
detonation of an AP blast-mine incident is reduced to a

minimum.... Hand tools should be designed to be used at
a low angle to the ground and should provide adequate
stand-off from an anticipated point of detonation
[emphasis added].

Some hand tools that have injured their users

The use of “should” instead of “shall” was a disappointment. But
everyone’s views had to be combined and the end result is a
workable compromise. For more information on blast-resistant handtools, see the article “Safer Demining Handtools in Zimbabwe”7 in
Vol 6.2 of the JMU Journal of Mine Action.
Blast-Boots as PPE
Blast-boots or mine-boots are awarded the lowest IMAS
requirement—one that says that a user of the IMAS “may” like to
consider their use. Even that low level of requirement is made
conditional on there being new evidence that they are effective. On
blast-resistant footwear, the IMAS reads:
... [D]emining organisations may consider providing blast
proof boots for the protection of feet and lower limbs
where there is a significant risk that cannot be reduced
by SOPs [Standard Operating Procedures] alone,
provided that the blast boots being considered are
proven to be effective in reducing that risk.
Note: The effectiveness and operational benefits of mine
boots is still a contentious issue within the mine
clearance community.... To date, only one independent
trial (U.S. State Department sponsored) has been
conducted, which identified that the cost of provision and
replacement is high, whilst the benefits are unproven.
There is currently a danger that they offer “false
security.”...

A blast-boot after the wearer stepped on a PMA-3 with
35 g high explosive.
In the tests referred to,8 one well-known supplier failed to provide
enough samples for a meaningful conclusion to be reached. When
assessing the rest, there was some evidence that injury might be
reduced if a wearer stepped on mines with a main charge of 28g of
high explosive, but there was still a real risk of a subsequent
surgical amputation (especially in countries with poor medical
facilities). Very few of the mines that deminers step on contain as
little as 28g of high explosive. Since the most effective blast-boots
rely on lifting the foot away from the initiation, they are all clumsy to
wear and work in—especially when moving on rough ground and
when standing and kneeling continually. In my opinion, they are
uncomfortable and impractical, and offer only a false sense of
security. A deminer should never miss a mine and then step on it. If
he does, there is something wrong with the procedures being used,
and further accidents should be prevented by addressing those
failings.
Canvassing by those with a commercial interest in selling boots had
occurred—and might have led to blast-boots becoming an IMAS
requirement if it were not for the independent research in the United
States Army Institute of Surgical Research (USAISR) Lower
Extremity Assessment Programme (LEAP) study, so the
independent study has been very useful. Because blast-boots are
still being offered by manufacturers, I would like the LEAP testing to
be repeated with a greater number of tests and a wider range of
boots as soon as possible.
Helmets as PPE
The

IMAS states that users “should” consider the use of a helmet if
they believe they have a 360° risk. I agree that this would be
preferable if there really is a risk to the head from behind. However,
safety distances and safe working practices in fragmentation mine
areas should mean that a deminer never has a 360° risk, and the
available evidence suggests that this is really the case.

Fragmentation damage to a helmet
In 60 percent of recorded accidents, the deminers involved had
been issued blast visors (they were not always worn). In 68 percent
of these, the visor was attached to a helmet. There are no examples
in the database where wearing a helmet reduced injury in any
significant way. By a “significant reduction” I mean a reduction in the
range of recorded injuries. For example, it is likely that a few
fragments were deflected by the helmet pictured on the right, but
that did not prevent the wearer suffering very severe head injuries.
He died, but it was not considered of much importance to decide
whether he died from his head wounds or from the extensive body
penetrations that he also suffered, despite his frag-jacket. There
was even some argument over whether the helmet was being worn
(or worn properly) at the time, but the in-and-out damage tells us
that this was irrelevant to the outcome for the victim.
It is important that a visor should be held steady on the wearer’s
head, and a helmet can be used to do this. This can also be
achieved using one of many of the open head-frames that are used
to support visors and are preferred by demining groups like
MineTech, HALO Trust, the UN Accelerated Demining Programme
(UNADP), the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Norwegian
Peoples Aid (NPA). There is no evidence to support the claim that it
is necessary to strap the visor to the head with a chin-strap. Indeed
there is some evidence that, when worn loosely, such a chin-strap
can increase injury. An unsecured visor tends to be torn away as the
blast-front passes. To an observer, this can look as though the visor
has failed. In fact, at 60cm from any AP blast-mine, the fragments of
soil, stone, roots and plastic mine casing are moving ahead of the
blast front. They hit the visor first, and the passing blast front then
takes the visor with it, meaning that the wearer’s face and eyes are
protected at the critical time.
In most accidents when excavating an AP blast mine in which the
victim was wearing a visor without a helmet, the visor was torn away
by the passage of the blast front. In many accidents when the victim

was wearing a helmet and visor and the helmet was not secured,
the helmet and visor were also torn away. The victims only suffered
eye injuries if their visors were raised at the time of the blast.

The kind of visor/collar interface that is recommended in IMAS. The
long visor is obligatory.
So IMAS once again reflect what can be derived from the accident
record as a well-informed level of minimum protection needs.
Effectively, if a demining group wants to wear a helmet, they can,
and if they want to use an open head-frame, they can. But they must
wear a visor that provides “full frontal coverage of face and throat.”
Almost all the visors made to fit combat helmets are short and
provide no throat protection at all. This means that almost all helmet
visors do not reach the minimum PPE requirement for a visor as
stated in IMAS. In a few cases, lower jaw and throat injuries have
occurred when the victim was wearing a short helmet visor that did
not connect with or overlap the collar on the body protection.
A Sensible Minimum
Section 10.30 of IMAS, entitled Personal Protective Equipment
deserves close study. If you read it carefully, paying attention to the
difference between obligations and preferences, you will find that
the obligatory requirements are both sensible and practical. They
can be applied without hardship and have been applied by some
groups for many years. The requirements are the “minimum”—and
any group can take additional measures, but every demining group
working to the IMAS standards must wear frontal blast armour and a
long visor when engaged in manual demining.
The IMAS include the disclaimer that “although this standard lays
down distances at which the PPE must be effective, it must be
emphasised that this does NOT imply to deminers that they will be
safe at such distances.” Given the unpredictable nature of blast
events, this is wise. Also, the wearer’s arms are exposed and can

be at a high risk if he is using an inappropriate tool as he works.
The IMAS PPE requirements were informed by the accident record
but took other things into account, such as deminer acceptability.
Deminers do not want to wear protection that they believe is
unnecessary, which is probably why the PPE requirements in the
earlier issue of IMAS were widely ignored. If a group can afford it
and would feel safer using PPE with a higher specification, they
should do so—as long as the increased weight and discomfort do
not lead to the PPE being discarded as soon as the supervisor’s
back is turned.
I recommend that any excess money in the budget is used to
replace the visors regularly—because they do get easily scratched
and IMAS state “equipment shall be examined on a regular basis to
ensure that it is suitable for use [emphasis added].” If this had been
done, I know of more than 50 blind deminers who would probably
have benefited. Further excess funds should be used to purchase
hand-tools that have been designed to protect the user’s hands and
arms.
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